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How can we assess which countries select more experienced leaders for the highest o ce? There is a wide variation in
prior career paths of national leaders within, and even more so between, regime types. Obtaining a truly comparative
measure of political experience is therefore a challenge and empirical studies have to rely on proxies instead. We propose
PolEx, a measure of political experience that abstracts away from the details of the career paths and generalises based on
duration of experience in politics, its quality, and its breadth. We draw on a novel data set of around 2,000 leaders from
1950 to 2017 and use a Bayesian latent variable model to estimate PolEx. We illustrate how the new measure can be
used comparatively by addressing the question whether democracies select more experienced leaders. We find that while
on average they do, this century the di erence with non-democracies has declined dramatically. Future research may
leverage PolEx to investigate the role of prior political experience in, for example, policy-making and crisis management.
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One of the central concepts in the study of political leadership, particularly in international
relations, is that of individual experience (Bak and Palmer, 2010; Horowitz et al., 2005; Potter,
2007). More experienced leaders are less likely to be tested by adversaries and are often found to
handle international crises more competently (e.g., Gelpi and Grieco, 2001). If the July 25, 2019
controversial phone conversation between Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelensky—both political outsiders prior to assuming o ce—is any evidence, less experienced
leaders may also be found wanting in their knowledge of diplomatic practice.1 As the former
foreign minister of Russia (1998–2004) Igor Ivanov noted, “a ‘newcomer’ in international politics
is usually harder to work with: the lack of experience often translates into inconsistent and
unpredictable behavior; it leads to subjective, emotional and at times erroneous decisions ...”
(cited in Englund, 2016).
We propose a new empirical measure of political experience at the time of selection into
o ce. Our statistical approach di ers from expert qualitative assessments of an outsider status as
well as from studies that rely on particular proxies to account for experience, such as leaders’
age (Bak and Palmer, 2010; Horowitz et al., 2005), time in o ce (Gelpi and Grieco, 2001;
Potter, 2007), type of prior career (Horowitz et al., 2005), or that equate specific experience with
competence (Yu and Jong-A-Pin, 2016). Instead, we fit a Bayesian latent variable model on a
range of experience-related indicators to estimate a new measure of political experience: the
PolEx (together with associated measures of uncertainty). We provide our estimates for 1,949
national leaders across the world from 1950 to 2017. Our measure accounts for length (years in
politics), breadth (experience in formal and informal posts), and quality (types of positions).
Finally, we demonstrate the use of this new measure by addressing the question whether
democracies select more experienced leaders than dictatorships. This is not only intrinsically
interesting but it also has implications for international security, if we contrast an apparent rise
of outsiders across the democratic world with more experienced leadership in such countries as
China or Russia.
1See www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Unclassified09.2019.pdf, September 28, 2019.
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What Makes a Political Leader Experienced?
Generally speaking, experience is a multifaceted and nebulous term, because it does not only
depend on age or positions occupied, but also on various activities and events, as well as the
individual’s ability to learn from such events. A political leader may be competent across a
wide range of activities, including negotiation, mentoring, organisation, persuasion, strategy, and
public relations. These skills are acquired in a wide range of di erent contexts, including social
and professional, political and non-political contexts. Di erent leaders will therefore have built
up their arsenal of skills across di erent experiences in life, moderated by their ability to learn
and other innate traits.
Can political experience be measured? We believe that all things being equal, important
political skills should be on average more developed among individuals who have held senior
political posts, or held them longer. For instance, to underline President George Bush (1989–93)’s
level of experience, Horowitz et al. (2005, 668) point out that this leader was a “director of the
Central Intelligence Agency, an ambassador, and a vice president." We can look at an individual’s
political biography and make an informed guess about that individual’s level of experience in
politics.
A key challenge in identifying the relevant prior experience is to ensure that a measurement
remains valid across di erent regimes. The manner in which one acquires political experience
might be very di erent in a parliamentary democracy than it is in a military junta, but we
nevertheless want to be able to compare the levels of experience across all regimes. Democracies
may attract more educated leaders (Besley and Reynal-Querol, 2011), while dictatorships may be
led by leaders with non-political backgrounds, such as from the military. Clearly, individuals
with traits conforming to the norms of their regime will find it easier to progress their political
careers. In order to be able to generalise, however, we specifically focus on political experience,
experience that took place explicitly and primarily in formal politics, not general life experience
or leadership experience in the military, corporate sector, and so forth.
While we rely on a prior-experience approach to political experience, other perspectives exist.
In the international relations literature, scholars often take age as a proxy for experience (Bak and
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Palmer, 2010), which we refer to as age-experience. Horowitz et al. (2005, 664, 667) point out
that older leaders have more experience and more credibility. Nevertheless, the youngest leader
of an EU country (32 in 2019), Sebastian Kurz of Austria, had served as Foreign Minister and
member of parliament for four years prior to his chancellorship. In contrast, Donald Trump of the
US, 70 years old at the time of entering the White House, had no prior political experience.
Another common proxy is education-experience. For example, Besley and Reynal-Querol
(2011) argue that better education leads to more competent leaders, and demonstrate that
democracies select more educated leaders than non-democracies. However, a leader with
little education but years of active engagement in the party will have significantly more relevant
experience than one who has a professor background, with limited experience outside of academia.
More commonly than age or education, time in o ce may be used as an explicit proxy for
political experience (Gelpi and Grieco, 2001; Horowitz et al., 2005; Potter, 2007). However, a
focus on tenure-experience ignores prior experience and cannot explain why di erent regimes
select leaders of di erent levels of experience in the first place.
While the approaches discussed above may account for the general levels of experience,
experience may also be more domain-specific (Yu and Jong-A-Pin, 2016). For example, a
minister of finance might have domain-experience in the finance sector. When making a generic
comparison between countries, across regimes, and over decades, a formulation of political
experience that is less idiosyncratic is required, however.
In summary, there exists a significant amount of conceptual stretching and proxy-ing for
experience and related concepts of age, competence, and tenure in o ce. Instead, we focus on
the experience in actual politics, prior-experience, prior to becoming a national leader.
The Data on Political Experience of Leaders
To measure the political experience of leaders across the world, we begin with the Cursus
Honorum data (Baturo, 2016). We expand the coverage to include more than 450 additional
political leaders in o ce before and after the range of these data, in 1950–59 and 2010–17. The
resulting data set includes 1,949 individuals in o ce from 1 January 1950 to 31 December 2017.
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Our goal is to account for both the length of involvement in politics, the breadth, and the
quality of such involvement. A key indicator for the length of experience is the number of
years in formal politics. This includes years of public service as, among other, a member of
parliament, minister, governor, and mayor. Years in politics in democratic regimes are relatively
straightforward to measure, provided relevant biographical data are available. For the majority of
non-democratic leaders it requires judgement as to what constitutes service in formal politics
and what the positions of relevance are in a particular dictatorship. For illustration, consider Hu
Jintao of China (2003–12) with 21 years of experience. In 1982 Hu was selected a promising
young cadre for rapid promotion and became an alternate member of the Central Committee, as
well as the Secretary of the Communist Youth League Central Committee (Ewing, 2003, 21).
Prior to 1982 he held a series of engineering jobs and also served as party secretary in regional
construction departments (Ewing, 2003, 20). However, in the context of a party regime, his career
prior to 1982 was more akin to that of a civil servant. Only when he became the Secretary of
the Communist Youth League his political career proper began. Subsequently, he served as a
provincial party secretary in two regions, and then joined the Politburo Standing Committee. It is
true that Hu’s experience is di erent from that of his peers in democracies. At the same time,
being a provincial party secretary is akin to regional governor, and sitting on a Politburo Standing
Committee, functionally, resembles a powerful ministerial post in a democracy.
Not all politically relevant experience is that in formal posts. Future leaders participate in
politics as political party organisers, they participate in electoral campaigns, and acquire political
experience in non-political posts. Therefore, the second key variable, total years in politics,
relaxes the requirement of serving in formal posts and additionally includes years in political
campaigns, years as one of the opposition leaders, of active party membership or any other
politics-related activity.
Experience in politics is not only about the length of service. The quality and breadth of such
experience matter too. Figure 1 displays descriptive statistics about politically relevant posts the
leaders have had in the past, separately for democracies and dictatorships. Democratic leaders are
more likely to hold portfolios of the minister of environment, the economy or local government,
or intergovernmental bodies. Dictators are more likely to have served as ministers of trade or
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Figure 1: Prior Political Posts of Leaders
Note: Categories report percentage of leaders with experience in particular posts prior to the highest
o ce, sorted by relative di erences between democratic and nondemocratic leaders. Categories do not
add up to 100 per cent because leaders may occupy more than one post. For ease of presentation, the
party leader/opposition leader/MP category is not included in the figure (21% and 6% in democracy and
dictatorship, respectively).
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public works, or served in the politburo, security agencies or as diplomats. Below we leverage
these data to estimate the latent scores of experience.
The Latent-Variable Model to Estimate PolEx
While we have a number of indicators of experience in politics, it is unclear how these add
up to a single experience score. How much do we weigh each indicator? How much does
formal experience count, relative to being “on the ground” as a party activist? How much more
experience does a former minister of foreign a airs have than a former minister of railroads? We
can address these questions by estimating a latent variable model to represent political experience,
of which our various indicators are the observed implications.
There is an important di erence with comparable measurement models such as that of
democracy by Treier and Jackman (2008). Democracies share a range of characteristics, and the
more these are present, the more likely it can be classified as a democracy. When it comes to
political experience however, the type of experience varies significantly between leaders. One
individual may have experience as a deputy party leader, moving on to a junior minister role, to
then become minister of finance and eventually the leader. Another person may reach the summit
of power through an entirely di erent trajectory. Both might be similarly experienced overall.2
To avoid the negative correlations between di erent types of experience due to mutual
exclusivity of posts for the same individual at the same time, we aggregate posts into broad
categories. We group all posts together into political posts in general—a full list is depicted
in Figure 1—as well as into senior political posts and ministerial positions. We create a set of
dummy variables taking the value of one if the individual occupied at least one, two, or three
of the general posts, respectively, as well as a dummy whether the individual occupied any of
the senior posts. In addition, we include two variables counting the number of years of political
experience—one for formal posts only and another more broadly defined—as well as a variable
2This complication relates to the distinction between formative and reflective measurement models in the psychology
and marketing literatures (Curtis and Jackson, 1962; Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer, 2001). See the supplementary
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Figure 2: Measurement Model of Political Experience
Note: Measurement model specification of political experience, where squares represent observable,
constitutive indicators of a latent construct, political experience.
counting the number of times one has served as the national leader in the past. The diagram
in Figure 2 outlines our measurement model specification. While the career trajectories will
di er between individuals, more experienced leaders will have held more posts, for longer, at
more senior levels. The reduction of the model to generic count variables and dummies allows
us to estimate the latent variable model in a similar vein to that of the measurement model for
democracy by Treier and Jackman (2008).
Aside from the estimation issues caused by the mutual exclusivity of di erent posts at the
same time, this aggregation also maximises the validity and comparability across regimes, by
raising the level of abstraction (Sartori, 1970). The length of experience, the number of senior
posts, the number of political posts—whatever these posts might be—on average should get us a
valid cross-regime measurement. Anything else makes comparing experience across regimes
impossible. While the richness of experience between di erent national leaders is important
and interesting, it is precisely incorporating that richness which makes it impossible to measure
political experience across regime types. Even though detailed types of o ces and pathways
cannot be seen from our measure, on average, high score should correspond to higher levels of
political experience.
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We estimate the PolEx using a Bayesian framework that allows us to get full posterior
information on uncertainty for each of the individual scores. Our model can be seen as a set of
simultaneous regression equations, where the same latent variable explains the various indicator
variables.
Because it is reasonable to assume that the initial experience will be more significant than
later additional years, we apply an inverse hyperbolic sine transformation—akin to a logarithmic
transformation—on the three count variables. For the transformed count variables, we assume a
normal distribution, while for the dummy variables we use a logistic specification. Each equation
contains a discrimination parameter, with a prior b1 ⇠  (2,1) and a di culty parameter with
prior b0 ⇠ N (0,1).3 For example, for the experience in years indicator we have:
EY ⇤i ⇠ N
 
b1,EY (gi  b0,EY ),sEY
 
,
with EY ⇤ the observed experience in years, after the inverse hyperbolic transformation. The latent
variable itself has a prior distribution of g ⇠ N (0,1). This follows the two parameter logistic
formulation of the item response theory model (Glockner-Rist and Hoijtink, 2003), which is
equivalent to a factor analysis model with binary or mixed responses (Quinn, 2004). As in other
applications in political science, the focus is on the latent variable scores for each observation, as
opposed to the discrimination parameters that are the focus in psychometric applications (Clinton
et al., 2004). The model is estimated using the No-U-Turn Sampler algorithm (Carpenter et al.,
2017), using eight chains of 20,000 iterations, of which 4,000 are discarded as a warm-up.4
Table 1 provides estimates of the discrimination and di culty parameters. Di culty
parameters capture the extent to which, on average, leaders obtain a high level of experience on
the particular indicator. Discrimination parameters, equivalent to factor loadings, capture the
extent to which items are able to separate experienced from inexperienced leaders, but they cannot
be directly compared between those for continuous variables and those for the binary variables.
3Using a gamma prior ensures positive coe cients, such that the latent variable captures experience, not inexperience.
Quinn (2004) and Clinton et al. (2004) implement similar constraints.
4The Gelman-Rubin convergence statistics range from QR = 0.9995 to QR = 1.0014, which indicates convergence.
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Discrimination (b1) Di culty (b0)
Nr of years experience 1.127 -2.712
(0.025) (0.065)
Nr of years formal experience 1.197 -2.142
(0.027) (0.055)
One prior political post 2.352 -0.927
(0.136) (0.050)
Prior top post or ministry 1.194 0.535
(0.087) 0.053)
Two prior political posts 1.316 1.292
(0.122) (0.090)
Three prior political posts 2.339 1.728
(0.120) (0.297)
Nr of previous times in o ce 0.094 -1.486
(0.158) (0.008)
      1: Parameter Estimates and Relative Importance of Component Variables
Note: Standard errors for the model parameters in parentheses.
To compare the relative importance of component variables, we can visualise the predicted values
on the component variables given the latent variable score based on item response curves, which
are presented in Figure 3.
All those who are scored to have above average experience at the time of entering o ce
tend to have had at least one prior political post. In turn, those with higher levels of experience
also typically tend to have had a senior post or ministry. Having had multiple prior posts is less
common. Among those at the highest levels of PolEx there is only just over 60% chance of having
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Figure 3: Item Response Curves
Note: Item response curves for all component variables of the latent variable model, with predicted probabilities for
binary component variables (left) and linear predictions for count variables (right).
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Figure 4: PolEx of World Leaders in 2017
Note: PolEx scores from the time of entry into o ce of incumbent leaders in o ce on 31 December 2017.
had three prior political posts. We also observe a strong relationship between PolEx and years of
experience in formal and informal politics.
As a test of face validity, Figure 4 demonstrates the PolEx scores of all leaders in the world,
while Figure 5 displays the PolEx scores for the most and least experienced leaders in the world
in 2017. In both cases, leaders in o ce in 2017 are included, while their level of experience
at the time they took o ce is assessed. The results are intuitive as we can distinguish between
experienced leaders such as Xi Jinping of China, and known inexperienced leaders such as Trump
of the US.
Regime Type and the Experience of Political Leaders
With the assistance of the PolEx scores, we are able to address a research question posed earlier:
do democracies select more politically experienced leaders? Figure 6 reveals that over time
and on average, democracies outperform dictatorships. However, the stark di erences visible
until mid-eighties have been replaced with a closer gap in this century as dictatorships came to
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Abdullah II Ibn Hussein (Jordan) 1999
Prayuth Chan-ocha (Thailand) 2014
Hassanal Bolkiah (Brunei) 1967
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Abdel Aziz (Mauritania) 2008
Qabus Bin Said (Oman) 1970
Muhammad VI (Morocco) 1999
Mswati (Swaziland) 1986
Miro Cerar (Slovenia) 2014
Jammeh (Gambia) 1994
Trump (United States) 2017
Jovenel Moise (Haiti) 2017
Hamad Isa Ibn Al-Khalifah (Bahrain) 1999
Horacio Cartes (Paraguay) 2013
Bai Koroma (Sierra Leone) 2007
Jimmy Morales (Guatemala) 2016





Angela Merkel (Germany) 2005
Narendra Modi (India) 2014
E. Carvalho (Sao Tome e Principe) 2016
Ibrahim Keita (Mali) 2013
Sabah IV (Kuwait) 2006
Daniel Ortega 2 (Nicaragua) 2007
Magufuli (Tanzania) 2015
Nicolas Maduro (Venezuela) 2013
Vucic (Yugoslavia) 2017





Tom Thabane 2 (Lesotho) 2017
Mariano Rajoy (Spain) 2011
Xi Jinping (China) 2012
Sauli Niinisto (Finland) 2012
Vorachith (Laos) 2016
Salman (Saudi Arabia) 2015
Essebsi (Tunisia) 2014
Mnangagwa (Zimbabwe) 2017
Raul Castro (Cuba) 2011










Figure 5: PolEx Estimates for Selected Leaders
Note: Average PolEx scores for the 12% least, and 12% most experienced leaders currently in o ce, with
95% equal tailed credible intervals. In addition, the plot includes Trump, Xi, Putin, Modi, and Merkel.















Figure 6: Average PolEx of Political Leaders, 1950–2017
Note: Average value PolEx, at the time of entering o ce, with 95% equal tailed credible intervals and
smoothened curves.
recruit more experienced leaders, finally closing the gap in recent years.5 If democratic leadership
becomes relatively less experienced, democracies may find themselves at a disadvantage in
settings where leadership matters, such as in international diplomacy.
Conclusions
Current scholarship has gone beyond the “leaders matter” argument and studies what in particular
about leaders, such as their background traits and careers, matter for survival in o ce (Yu and
Jong-A-Pin, 2016), post-o ce employment (Baturo, 2017), or conflict behaviour (Horowitz
et al., 2005). Empirical scholars can now rely on the PolEx score to investigate whether leaders’
experience matters for policy outcomes. A nebulous and unobservable variable such as political
experience is di cult to measure, in particular across regime types. Having discussed several
conceptual perspectives, we opted for a prior-experience approach. Drawing from a new data set
5The supplementary appendix contains additional robustness checks on the estimation of PolEx and the finding
regarding democracies and non-democracies.
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on nearly 2,000 national leaders, we estimate PolEx, a latent experience score. Measurement
equivalence across democratic and non-democratic regimes is established by demonstrating the
high correlation between latent scores whether estimated jointly or separately by regime type.6
We establish that democracies tend to select more experienced leaders than non-democracies, but
that this distinction has diminished over time.
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1 Further Details about PolEx
Figure 1 plots the average PolEx scores for all leaders in the world, irrespective of their
political regime, at the time of their taking political office. The average PolEx score for the
entire data set is zero by design, but there is variation over time, with more experienced
leaders being selected at the beginning and the end of the time period, and some outliers of













Figure 1: Average PolEx of Political Leaders, 1950–2017
Note: Average value PolEx, at the time of entering office, with 95% equal tailed credible intervals.
Here as in other plots, including Figure 5 in the paper, the equal tailed credible intervals
are found by taking the 2.5% and 97.5% quantiles of the posterior distribution of the respec-
tive coefficients. Here, the average score across all new leaders in a given year is calculated
for each iteration of the Markov Chain Monte Carlo sampling algorithm, and the quantiles
subsequently calculated on the thus obtained posterior distribution of the annual mean. This
method therefore fully leverages the detailed posterior information obtained in a Bayesian
framework (cf. Quinn, 2004; Clinton, Jackman and Rivers, 2004).
In turn, Figure 2 displays national average PolEx scores for all countries in the world
for the whole 1950–2017 period. Countries such as the United Kingdom, Ireland, Saudi
Arabia, China, Soviet Union/Russia have the most experienced leaders historically, while
Brunei, Oman, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone or Mauritania are those that
feature the least experienced leadership at the time of entry into office. Regionally however,
Western countries and Eastern Europe have the most experienced leadership at the time of
entry into office, and Africa and the Middle East—the least experienced.
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Figure 2: Average National PolEx, 1950–2017
Note: Average PolEx scores all national political leaders, 1950–2017.
1.1 Formative versus reflective measurement models and PolEx
In the psychology and marketing literatures, there is a distinction between reflective and for-
mative measurement models (Curtis and Jackson, 1962; Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer,
2001). In a reflective model, the indicators used are reflective of, i.e. caused by, the latent
variable, while in a formative model the indicators constitute, or cause, the latent variable. In
a reflective model one expects the indicators to be highly correlated, since they are caused
by the same factor, but in a formative model this is not necessarily the case (Curtis and
Jackson, 1962). While measuring democracy may be seen as a formative model, with the
indicators as constituent elements of democracy, Treier and Jackman (2008) were able to
ignore the distinction between these two approaches because of the intercorrelation between
the indicators. In our application, where a current level of political experience is determined
by prior political activity, but where this activity can take many different trajectories, only
formative models can be applied. The significant drawback is that a formative model per
se, without integration into a broader causal framework, is statistically underdetermined.
Since not all indicators need to correlate, it is not the primary dimensions of the underlying
correlation of the indicators that can be taken as the measure of the latent construct.
Similar to Treier and Jackman (2008), we can avoid the complications of the estimations
of the formative model to a large extent by relying on the high correlation between the
underlying indicators of the main concept. The mutual exclusivity of different posts at the
same time for the same individual generate low or negative correlations, but by aggregating
the posts into broad categories, we are able to estimate the model as if it were a reflective
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model. We thus address the underdetermination problem of the formative model in a similar
vein to that of the measurement model for democracy by Treier and Jackman (2008).
1.2 Political experience and PolEx
In the paper we emphasised that in order to account for the political experience and gen-
eralise across regime types, we focus on political experience in politics that takes place
explicitly in formal or informal politics, not general life experience or leadership experience
in the military, corporate sector, trade unions, diplomatic service, etcetera. In other words,
this is a negative definition of experience, centred on excluding non-political types of ex-
perience. While we provided details about the logic of inclusion of particular components
of experience in politics, because of word count constraints these details were necessarily
brief. Here we can instead discuss a positive definition of experience, i.e., what goes into
experience in politics, as opposed to what political experience is not.
Even if we exclude non-political experience, what constitutes a political experience in
different countries and regimes may require further assumptions. We therefore focus—with
one exception to which we return below—on the experience in formal politics, such as being
a member of parliament, cabinet minister, province governor, a city mayor, or a member of
a sub-national parliament or regional executive, etcetera, that is, political experience in the
executive or legislative branches, including employed as a full-time party functionary in non-
democratic regimes. We exclude experience in non-political activities, such as in the military
or academia, as well as experience in non-formal politics (again, with one exception).
As explained in the paper, we include years in formal politics, previous time as a national
political leader, as well as the number of senior and non-senior political posts. Years in
formal politics, or previous time(s) as a national leader are numeric indicators that can be
understood in the same manner in different countries, in democracy and non-democracy
alike. Indeed, even though democracies are more likely to give their leaders a second chance,
leaders do return to office in dictatorships too, such as Batista of Cuba or Rawlings of Ghana,
who returned to political leadership after interim periods. Likewise, years in formal politics,
whether one, five or twenty years, is a measure that can be applied to democratic and non-
democratic leaders alike.
To account for the quality and breadth of experience in formal politics, we also include
the number of top posts, senior posts, and all political posts. In presidential democracies
and many non-democratic regimes headed by de facto leaders who do not have the titles of
prime ministers themselves (e.g. when dictators have the titles of presidents, party general
secretaries or head of state), the post of prime minister can be regarded as a top political
post. The posts of finance and foreign ministers are senior ministerial posts, whether in
democracy and dictatorship, even if the precise ranking order of importance of these posts
may depend on the type of regime (Baturo and Elkink, 2014). These posts are still relatively
senior posts across regime types.
We can also account for the important political posts (in formal politics of their coun-
tries), in democracy and dictatorship. These are the posts we include in Table 1. As com-
ponents of political experience, we include political posts, listed in the descriptive figure in
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the paper. These are the posts that are present in both democracies and non-democracies.
We exclude posts that can only be present in one type of political regime. We therefore
include posts, or their close equivalents, that democratic and non-democratic leaders alike
have, or can have in their professional background. Table 1 provides details about the types
of posts that we count. As can be seen, among democratic and non-democratic leaders,
there are posts of ministers of education, ministers of healthcare or capital city mayors,
even chiefs of security service (George H. W. Bush who served as the Director of Central
Intelligence in the USA—a democracy). Even the minister of environment or that commu-
nications that are encountered in democracies only, as denoted in bold font—in principle
they can be encountered in non-democracies too. Indeed, if President Berdymukhamedov
of Turkmenistan—a non-democratic regime, was the minister of healthcare in the past, in
principle, in other dictatorships, other leaders may serve as ministers of environment during
their careers. Even very few posts associated with the EU, in principle can be found in the
background of non-democratic leaders in the future. It has not been realised yet, but given
that a current EU member, Hungary, was down-ranked from its democracy status in 2018 by
the Freedom House, in principle its Prime Minister could have had the EU background (such
as Dalia Grybauskaite (2009–19) of Lithuania). The only other exception is the post of the
politburo member, a rough equivalent of the cabinet minister in a democracy. While this
post is not encountered among democratic leaders, it is an important political post across
many non-democratic regimes that cannot be excluded. In principle, former officials in a
non-democratic regimes who have served as politburo members can also run for democratic
office in the same country, after transition. We exclude posts that are very regime specific,
like being the member of the royal household, or rebel leader, or the chief of army staff.
By including the number of such posts, and grouping them into three categories that are
comparable across regime types, we assume that higher values will account for more breadth
and quality of experience in formal politics, in democracy and dictatorship.
Finally, the only indicator that relaxes our focus on formal politics, and the posts in for-
mal politics, is that of the number of years in politics in total, not just in formal politics.
It includes all years in politics prior to assuming the highest office, including years in civil
service, also colonial service or political service in the former colonial or metropolitan insti-
tutions, such as the membership of the French National Assembly, French Union Assembly,
local colonial assembly between 1946 and the time of independence in the former French
colonies, or the secretary of the republican Communist party in the Soviet Union, for exam-
ple. Years active membership in political opposition, revolutionary movement, anti-colonial
struggle and any other political-related and revolutionary activity, running for presidential
office unsuccessfully, are also counted whenever possible. This measure therefore includes
years of political experience in activities that are often regime- or even country-specific.
However, because it is measured in years it can be included in the model without making
specific assumptions as to specific political posts that may, or may not be present in differ-
ent regimes. This measure gives us extra leverage to account for these residual aspects of
political experience that other included measures, centred on formal politics, do not include.
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Democracy Non-democracy
Prior top post PM, vice-president, president, pre-
independence political leader
PM, vice-president, president, pre-
independence political leader1
Prior top ministry Minister of finance (chancellor of the
exchequer, etc), MFA, vice-PM various
Minister of finance, MFA, vice-PM
various, Politburo member
Prior political posts, exclud-
ing top posts
(regional): mayor of capital city, re-
gional governor, mayor of other city,
regional politician other; (parliament):
house speaker, senate speaker, deputy
house speaker; (minister): minister of
interior, minister of justice, minister
of education, minister of the economy,
minister of health (and related portfo-
lios), minister-chief of staff, minister
of agriculture, minister of trade, min-
ister of transport, minister of labour,
minister of public works, minister of
local government, minister of budget,
minister of communications, minister
of environment, minister other portfo-
lios; (party): party leader, party secre-
tary; (other): minister of defence head
of security, EU commissioner, MEP,
deputy minister, various, central bank
governor, diplomat
(regional): mayor of capital city, re-
gional governor, mayor of other city,
regional politician other; (parliament):
house speaker, senate speaker, deputy
house speaker; (minister): minister of
interior, minister of justice, minister
of education, minister of the economy
minister of health (and related portfo-
lios), minister-chief of staff, minister of
agriculture, minister of trade, minister
of transport, minister of labour, minis-
ter of public works, minister of local
government, minister of budget, minis-
ter of communications, minister other
portfolios; (party): party leader, party
secretary; (other): minister of defence,
head of security, deputy minister, vari-
ous, central bank governor, diplomat
Table 1: Post Classifications of PolEx in Democracy and Non-democracy
Note: post categories that are only present in one regime type are in bold. 1If a leader occupies national leader-
ship post prior to state independence, e.g., Mohammed V, the king of Morocco (1957–61), Sultan of Morocco
(1927–53, 55–7) prior to Morocco’s independence in 1957. Similarly, Sukarno (1949–67) of Indonesia was
the national president from 1945, prior to independence of 1949.
1.3 Examples of individual leaders
Winston Churchill, the British Prime-Minister for the second time from 1951–55, has the
highest score of PolEx in the estimation sample of almost 2,000 leaders. This suggests
that the measure has strong face validity. The high score requires no explanation since
Churchill’s career is well known. The score is based on his long 49-year career in formal
politics from being elected as an MP in 1900 for the first time. From 1901 Churchill has
remained in politics for most of this time (with short breaks during WW1 and 1922–24) until
1940, occupying most of the important posts (including the Home office and the Chancellor).
Even out of office in 1945-51, Churchill remained in parliament as the party leader. His
high score is driven by the length of his experience, the number of senior political posts in
the past, his previous PM experience, as well as the breadth of his service (the number of
ministerial portfolios including those of the minister of state).
To illustrate the distribution of PolEx scores, Table 2 provides further examples of in-
dividual leaders, in both democracies and non-democracies, with brief descriptions of their
political career prior to obtaining the highest office in the nation. In the statistical model,
PolEx has a standard normal prior, so we find the lowest scores around  2 and the higher
scores around +2, two standard deviations away from the overall average level of political
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1 year in politics (presiden-
tial campaign), no experi-




1 year in politics (advisor to
PM), 1 year in formal poli-




6 years in formal politics,
PM (1999–2001), parlia-
mentary party leader (2002–
4), central bank governor
 0.128 Mwanawasa
(Zambia), 2002–8
11 years in politics (from
1990 in party politics) and 3
years in formal politics, vice
president (1991–94), also
MP
50th 0.302 Gillard (Aus-
tralia), 2010–13
12 years in formal poli-
tics in parliament, Deputy
Prime Minister (2007–10),






10 years in formal poli-
tics; minister of health (from




20 years in formal politics








11 years in formal politics,
14 years in politics incl.
deputy governor (2000-2),
regional governor (2002-6);
chief whip with ministerial




33 years in formal politics
including as justice minis-
ter (1959-60), as an MP and
house speaker (1960-76),
president (1974), speaker
and party leader (1976–93)
0.949 Bouteflika (Al-
geria), 1999–2019
29 years in formal politics






49 years in formal politics
from being elected as an MP
in 1900. From 1901 active in
politics for most of this time
(with short breaks during
WW1 and 1922-24). Home
office (1910-11), Chancel-
lor (1924-29), PM (1940-
45). In 1945-51, party leader
1.524 Mnangagwa
(Zimbabwe), 2017–
37 years in formal politics,
in addition to 18 years in
ZANU/ZAPU politics prior
to independence. MP (1980-





Table 2: Leaders’ Prior Experience in Politics, Different Percentiles of PolEx
1.4 PolEx and other measures of political experience
While to our knowledge no alternative measure of political experience prior to taking office
exists in the international relations and comparative literatures, we do find political experi-
ence regularly used in empirical analyses. The solution in these applications tends to be to
use a proxy for experience, most commonly age (Bak and Palmer, 2010; Horowitz, McDer-
mott and Stam, 2005) or education levels of leaders. Strictly speaking, in the leadership liter-
ature education is used in connection to associated competence, i.e., education-experience as
competence, similar to domain-experience. For example, Besley and Reynal-Querol (2011)





















Figure 3: PolEx by Age and Education of the Leader
Querol, 2011) and subsequently develop a data base on educational backgrounds, that is used
to demonstrate that democracies select more educated leaders than do non-democracies—
closely in line with the empirical trends of interest in this paper. Similarly, Ludwig (2002,
140) shows the distribution of grades in school of leaders by regime type, attempting to
show the higher level of competence in democracies. Much like age, education is a very
limited proxy for political experience. Indeed, scholars question whether education or even
competence matters for governance (Bienen and de Walle, 1991; Carnes and Lupu, 2015).
Since leaders’ age and education appear to be reasonable proxies for experience, how
does the PolEx measure compare? Do we capture basically the same variation, albeit in a
much more complicated manner? If so, we might as well stick to using these proxies, which
are easily comparable over time and between different political regimes.
Figure 3 provides some insight into the relation between age (at entry into office) and
our measure of political experience, as well as that of education—here reduced to a dummy
for the presence or absence of a university degree. Naturally, we do see that PolEx increases
with age, and with higher levels of education. Higher levels of education contribute to
improved changes to obtain more specialised higher office, political or non-political, and
can therefore be expected to correlate with political experience. Being of older age simply
allows for more years in which one could have obtained political experience—there is a
natural upper bound to the amount of political experience one can have at any given age.
The left plot does indeed suggest this upper bound effect, with no observations in the top-
left quadrant of the figure. Otherwise, there remains a high amount of variation in experience
within different age groups, however, suggesting that PolEx captures something well beyond
what age captures. Given that PolEx is by design based on explicit indicators of political




Nr of years experience 20.2 (12.1) 14.1 (12.9)
Nr of years formal experience 14.9 (10.4) 8.8 (10.2)
Previous times in office 0.2 (0.5) 0.1 (0.4)
(at least one time) 191 (9.7%) 87 (4.4%)
Prior top post or ministry 392 (38.5%) 327 (38.6%)
(prior top post) 215 (21.1%) 220 (25.9%)
(prior top ministry) 200 (19.7%) 126 (14.9%)
At least one prior political post 894 (87.9%) 561 (66.2%)
At least two prior political posts 219 (21.5%) 177 (20.9%)
Table 3: Components of PolEx in Democracy and Non-democracy
Note: Mean and standard deviation for continuous variables, counts and percentages for binary variables.
2 Political Experience and Democracy
2.1 Components of experience in democracies and non-democracies
Table 1 provided insight in the different types of posts that are included in our indicators
of political experience, and demonstrated in particular how the range of offices varies lit-
tle between democracies and non-democracies. This emphasises the comparability of our
measure of experience across political regimes, one of the key aims of our paper. So if the
range of posts varies little between democracies and non-democracies, how do the various
components then relate to the overall finding that democracies tend to—or at least tended to
until recently—select more experienced leaders than non-democracies?
Table 3 provides some insight into this question. It provides an overview of the dif-
ferent component variables underlying the latent variable model of PolEx and shows the
distribution, on average over time, between democracies and non-democracies. It is clear
that the overall result on the difference in political experience is not based on any particular
indicator, but holds across the board. While for the indicator on “top posts or ministries,”
non-democracies score higher than democracies in terms of top posts other than top min-
istries, on average between these two categories democracies and non-democracies are vir-
tually identical. Significant variation between democracies and non-democracies is visible
however in less senior prior posts and in terms of the average number of years experience,
in either formal or informal political posts.
To confirm that our findings regarding the difference between democracies and non-
democracies is not an artefact of the model specification to estimate PolEx, Table 4 includes
models explaining three of the component variables of PolEx by regime type: the count of
years in formal politics (1–2), polTopPost (3–4) and polTopMinistry (5–6). Because years
in politics is a count variable, models 1–2 are fitted as fixed-effects poisson models, and
models 3–6 are fitted as fixed-effects probit regressions. Results indicate that leaders in
democracies and wealthier countries, who are also older, tend to have longer records in
formal politics, while leaders in democracies are not more likely to hold top posts in the past,
such as multiple times as prime-ministers in the past in parliamentary regimes. In contrast,
leaders in democracies are less likely to serve as ministers of finance, foreign affairs, vice
prime-ministers, or politburo members, than leaders in dictatorships.
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Formal years polTopPost polTopMinistry
1: 2: 3: 4: 5: 6:
Democracy 0.257*** 0.207 -0.340**
(0.027) (0.132) (0.170)
GDP pc, (log) 0.295*** 0.301*** -0.493+ -0.437 0.198 0.052
(0.049) (0.050) (0.275) (0.291) (0.286) (0.289)
Economic growth 0.001 0.004** 0.021** 0.012 0.012 0.013
(0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Age at entry 0.030*** 0.029*** 0.033*** 0.034*** 0.011+ 0.011+
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Polity2 -0.000 -0.021 -0.017
(0.004) (0.019) (0.023)
Personalist regime -0.380*** 0.189 0.261
(0.077) (0.371) (0.440)
Military regime -1.018*** -1.046** -0.817**
(0.074) (0.363) (0.391)
Monarchy -0.626** -4.697 -0.053
(0.263) (102.814) (0.732)
Single party 0.333*** 0.077 0.322
(0.062) (0.332) (0.385)
Presidential 0.014 0.115 -0.297
(0.053) (0.286) (0.306)
Constant 0.017 -0.139 0.572 0.361 -5.691 -5.781
(0.204) (0.211) (1.199) (1.299) (152.687) (144.369)
N 1471 1368 1264 1166 1085 1028
c2 7005.07 6841.44 202.77 227.80 138.09 139.69
Table 4: Political Experience: Quantity and Quality? Note: Models 1–6 are estimated as fixed-
effects. Models 1–2 are poisson specifications with the number of years in formal politics as the dependent
variable; 3–6 are probit specifications with the dependent variable taking the value of one for top posts (3–4)
and top ministerial posts (5–6), as explained in text. Significant + p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
2.2 Different measures of democracy
Our finding on the difference between democracies and non-democracies of course relies
importantly on our measure of democracy. In the paper we relied on the Polity2 score (Mar-
shall and Jaggers, 2011), but alternative measurements of democracy would also have been
possible. Therefore, to examine whether results are sensitive to the choice of democracy
indicator, here we additionally examine the selection of experienced and not experienced
leaders into office under different measures of democracy and dictatorship.
Figure 4 plots the average values of PolEx for democracy and non-democracy, replicat-
ing Figure 5 in the paper using alternative commonly used measures of democracy. The
top left and right sub-figures follow binary indicators for democracy, the indicator provided
by Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) (CGV, left), and from Boix, Miller and Rosato
(2013) (right). The two figures at the bottom are both based on the indicator provided by
the Varieties of Democracy project by Coppedge et al. (2019). In this data set, countries
are classified as liberal democracies, electoral democracies, electoral autocracies, or closed
autocracies. The plot on the left contrasts the two democracy categories with the two autoc-
racy categories; the plot on the right the closed autocracies with the other three categories.
Finally, Figure 5 shows the level of political experience among newly selected leaders across






































































































































































































































































































































































Closed autocracy Electoral autocracy Electoral democracy Liberal democracy
Figure 5: Political Experience over Time: Four VDEM categories Note: Replication of Figure
5 in the paper, using Coppedge et al. (2019) to contrast regimes along the range from democracies to closed
autocracies, using smoothened curves.
Overall we find very similar patterns to those shown in Figure 5 in the paper, with a
greater gap between democracies and non-democracies in earlier decades than more re-
cently, but the measure of democracy does matter. The convergence is stronger if we draw
from Marshall and Jaggers (2011) and Coppedge et al. (2019) than if we rely on Cheibub,
Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) and Boix, Miller and Rosato (2013), but all four measures
indicate that the gap is closing.
In addition to visualisations, we can specify multivariate models to predict the values of
PolEx. The estimation sample includes leader-observations for first (or only) years in office.
The values of all explanatory variables are for the first year in office or lagged by one year,
as explained below. To account for country-specific unobserved traits, all specifications are
fitted as fixed-effects. The first model in Table 5 is a simple specification to predict whether
democracies select more experienced leaders. The explanatory variable, Democracy takes
the value of one if the Polity2 score is greater than or equal to six, and zero otherwise. As a
sensitivity test in columns 2–8 we instead include alternative indicators for democracy. The
second column contains a model specification where a regime is defined as democratic if it
takes a positive value on the Polity2 score, and as non-democratic otherwise. In the third
model we include Polity2 score as a continuous variable ranging from  10 to +10. Next,
in the fourth and fifth columns we include models with the alternative binary indicators for
democracy, CGV (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland, 2010) and BMR Boix, Miller and Rosato
(2013). Finally, we include the measure of democracy based on Varieties of Democracy in-
dicator from Coppedge et al. (2019), with regimes that are categorised as liberal or electoral
democracy counted as democracies. Model 7 includes the four categories as separate inde-
pendent variables. The last model includes an interval measure of democracy, v2x regime,
also from Coppedge et al. (2019). As can be seen, the choice of alternative variables does
not affect the results. Results indicate that democracies do select more experienced leaders
on average.
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Electoral autocracy, V-Dem 0.329***
(0.061)
Electoral democracy, V-Dem 0.534***
(0.073)




Constant 0.554+ 0.480 0.669** 0.535 0.543+ 0.555+ 0.456 0.341
(0.307) (0.300) (0.300) (0.325) (0.326) (0.308) (0.308) (0.309)
N 1935 1851 1851 1593 1681 1935 1917 1917
r
2 0.33 0.36 0.36 0.38 0.37 0.33 0.34 0.33
Table 5: Democracy and Leaders’ Political Experience Note: Models 1–8 are estimated as fixed-
effects regression specifications. Closed autocracy, V-Dem is the omitted baseline category in Model 7. Sig-
nificant + p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
2.3 Separating leaders of new states
All things being equal, leaders of newly independent states can be expected to have lower
PolEx scores than leaders of nations with the history of statehood. Since many democracies,
especially in the early nineties, are newly established states, this might potentially be part
of the explanation why the gap between democracies and non-democracies has narrowed in
recent decades. We do not find a stark differentiation between new and longer established
states in terms of the selection of experienced leaders, however. On average, leaders of new
states are assessed at  0.21, in contrast to a 0.02 average score of those with statehood.
Furthermore, there are no significant differences between leaders of new countries who are
democrats and dictators, as can be seen from Figure 6. If anything, newly minted democrats
are slightly less experienced than their non-democratic peers:  0.24 versus  0.20 (the dif-
ference is not statistically significant).
Figure 7 underlines this argument, where the replication of Figure 5 in the paper looks
very similar indeed when all leaders selected at the same time as a new state is established
are excluded from the data set. The change in the differentiation between democracies
and non-democracies in recent decades—in particular from the early nineties—cannot be
attributed to the greater prevalence of democracy among newly established states. While
leaders of newly independent states are likely to have lower experience on average, it does
















newly independent with statehood newly independent with statehood
Figure 6: PolEx, Independence, Regime Types. Note: Average PolEx score for leaders who assume















Figure 7: Political Experience over Time: Excluding New States Note: Replication of Figure 5 in
the paper, excluding all new states.
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Godmanis, Latvia -1.55 Snegur, Moldova 0.10
Akayev, Kyrgyzstan -1.53 Niyazov, Turkmenistan 0.25
Gamsakhurdia, Georgia -1.29 Mutalibov, Azerbaijan 0.28
Landsbergis, Lithuania -1.18 Nazarbaev, Kazakhstan 0.41
Shushkevich, Belarus -0.97 Kravchuk, Ukraine 0.48
Savisaar, Estonia -0.68 Yeltsin, Russia 0.53
Ter-Petrosyan, Armenia -0.68 Nabiyev, Tajikistan 0.90
Karimov, Uzbekistan -0.03
Table 6: First Post-Independence Leaders of the former USSR and their PolEx Scores
under colonial administration or in another state. For example, there is significant variability
among first post-Soviet leaders of newly independent states depending on whether they came
to power from the opposition, or elevated themselves from soviet republican administrations,
as can be seen from Table 6.
2.4 Adding control variables
Our analysis of democracies versus non-democracies is primarily to demonstrate that the
cross-regime comparability of our measure of political experience is valuable and can help
in answering questions about leader selection in different political regimes. It is not a de-
veloped causal argument, which would require a more elaborate theoretical framework, as
well as an explication of the causal mechanisms through which this differentiation between
regimes takes place. It is primarily meant as a descriptive exercise, one that raises more
questions than it answers—food for future research. Aside from a more thorough theoreti-
cal and empirical investigation of causal mechanisms, a proper causal analysis would require
appropriate controls for alternative explanations—similar to the investigation of new versus
established states in Section 2.3.
Nevertheless, the suggestive causal argument does imply that control variables might be
appropriate. Without attempting a full causal analysis, which we leave to future research, as
a simple test to account for possible omitted variables, Table 7 includes additional predic-
tors. For robustness, we include two different measures of democracy, based on Polity2 and
the CGV indicator (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland, 2010). It is conceivable that wealthier,
more complex societies, as well as countries in the midst of economic crisis, select more
experienced leaders. The lagged values of GDP per capita, Economic growth and Popula-
tion, mln are taken from Feenstra, Inklaar and Timmer (2015). Because newly independent
countries may have less experienced leaders (as shown in Figure 6), we include the number
of years from independence (COW, 2017), with a logarithmic transformation. Countries
under short periods of occupation are set to earlier statehood dates. Because several of the
constituent terms of PolEx include years of political experience, all things being equal, older
leaders will be more likely to have longer experience in politics, than younger leaders (as is
also evident in Figure 3). We therefore account for the possibility that the model identifies
the effects of democracy on experience, as opposed to effects of the likelihood of selecting
younger leaders. Finally, we also include the (log of) number of years a particular regime,
either democracy or dictatorship, has been in place, based on the durable indicator from
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1: 2: 3: 4:
Democracy 0.356*** 0.199**
(0.063) (0.074)
Democracy, CGV 0.589*** 0.347***
(0.068) (0.086)
GDP pc, (log) 0.041 0.004 -0.016 -0.128
(0.132) (0.144) (0.142) (0.151)
Economic growth 0.006 0.006 0.009+ 0.011**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Age at entry 0.027*** 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.025***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Population, mln 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Statehood, (log years) 0.027 -0.061
(0.051) (0.056)
Regime durability (log) 0.036 0.015
(0.031) (0.034)
Constant -1.443** -0.931 -1.056+ -0.587
(0.602) (0.648) (0.628) (0.663)
N 1469 1287 1068 936
r
2 0.45 0.49 0.50 0.54
Table 7: Democracy, Statehood, Regime Durability, and Leaders’ Experience Note: Models
1–4 are estimated as fixed-effects regression specifications. Significant + p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Marshall and Jaggers (2011).
Table 7 reveals that the coefficient on democracy remains statistically significant after ac-
counting for age, which is also statistically significant, while other predictors do not improve
on the prediction, except Economic growth in Models 3–4. The coefficient on Statehood,
years is not statistically significant. This could be explained by the fact that the founding
fathers of “young” nations, as well their successors, often have experience in politics in the
country from which they subsequently declared independence, as previously discussed and
evidenced from Table 6. Furthermore, Figure 6 revealed that at independence there are no
significant differences between democracies and non-democracies, even if there democratic
leaders of nations with statehood are more experienced, than dictators.
2.5 Results by subtypes of non-democracies
The PolEx measure may also be employed to compare leaders’ selection within the broader
regime types of democracies and non-democracies. For example, Linz (1994, 171–173)
argues that presidentialism is more likely to elect outsiders. Figure 8 indicates that leaders
of presidential democracies are indeed less experienced than their peers in parliamentary
regimes, but not dramatically so: the median value of their PolEx is 0.360, versus 0.497
under parliamentarism. In turn, among dictatorships, the rulers of party regimes are almost
as experienced as their democratic peers, followed by monarchs, then by personal dictators,
with military leaders at the bottom.
To confirm these findings on the variation between subtypes of regimes, Table 8 includes
two specifications fitted on a sample of democratic regimes only. Model 1 includes the bi-











Military Personal Monarchy Party Presidential Parliamentary
Figure 8: Experience in Politics and Political Regimes
Average value PolEx, at the time of entering office, per regime category. Non-democratic regimes are from
Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014).
zero if parliamentary (sourced from Przeworski et al., 2000). There are no statistically sig-
nificant differences between presidential and parliamentary regimes in terms of the overall
experience of their leaders (Models 1–2).
We also specify two additional models estimated on the sample of dictatorships only.
Table 8 also has models 3–4 that include three non-democratic regime categories, with the
Single party regime as the baseline category. Results indicate that leaders of personalist
and military regimes are less experienced than general-secretaries and presidents of party-
based regimes. Models 5–6 are estimated on a complete sample that includes democracies
and dictatorships. Because we are interested in institutional effects of different regimes,
we use the full Polity IV scale instead of a binary Democracy variable as a predictor. The
Parliamentary regime type is chosen as the baseline category.1 We find that leaders of
military and personalist regimes, as well as monarchies, are less experienced than prime-
ministers in parliamentary democracies. Leaders of party-based regimes and presidents in
presidential democracies have no statistically significant differences from prime-ministers,
in terms of their experience. This suggests that the distinction between democracy and non-
democracy is perhaps not the only relevant factor, and that the structuring of the political
careers through parties, common among democracies but also party dictatorships, equally
matters. Models 2, 4 and 6 in Table 4 further corroborate this finding, showing that it
does not depend on PolEx per se, but is also visible when separate indicators of political
experience are investigated.
1In several dozens of observations where there was a clash between categorisations of some regimes as
presidential democracy by Przeworski et al. (2000) versus a type of dictatorship by Geddes, Wright and Frantz
(2014), we reconciled based on Polity IV scores at the time of entry into office, i.e., as presidential democracy
if Polity IV is greater than or equal to six, and as the type of dictatorship otherwise.
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Democracy Dictatorship All
1: 2: 3: 4: 5: 6:
Presidential -0.132 -0.261
(0.187) (0.207)
GDP pc, (log) 0.298 -0.185 -0.006
(0.272) (0.322) (0.168)
Economic growth 0.006 -0.006 0.007
(0.006) (0.008) (0.004)
Age at entry 0.023*** 0.034*** 0.025***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.002)
Statehood, years -0.002 0.003 0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Personalist regime -0.488*** -0.721*** -0.595*** -0.406**
(0.147) (0.201) (0.129) (0.150)
Military regime -0.918*** -0.981*** -0.990*** -0.889***
(0.146) (0.182) (0.121) (0.131)
Monarchy 0.156 -1.551+ -0.551** -0.762**
(0.287) (0.890) (0.210) (0.305)
Polity2 0.013** 0.011
(0.007) (0.007)




Constant 0.667 -1.769 0.828+ -0.777 0.750** -0.946
(0.430) (1.153) (0.434) (1.268) (0.299) (0.717)
N 1018 888 627 422 1747 1401
r
2 0.25 0.34 0.47 0.59 0.41 0.50
Table 8: Regime Types and Leaders’ Political Experience Note: Models 1–6 are estimated as fixed-
effects regression specifications. Models 1–2 are estimated on a sample of democracies. Party regime is an
omitted category in Models 3–4; Parliamentary is an omitted category in Models 5–6. Presidential category
is adjusted not to include several regimes categorised as non-democratic in Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014),
as explained in text. Significant + p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
2.6 Political experience in military regimes
What constitutes an experience in politics varies across non-democratic regimes. Military
non-democratic regimes stand out. Almost always, leaders of military juntas are profes-
sional military officers who only have experience in the military and therefore no direct
political experience that can be comparable with that in other regimes. This does not mean
that leaders of military juntas have no relevant experience that may assist them in the job
of running the country—military service promotes valuable organisational skills as well as
character and leadership traits (Barlow, Jordan and Hendrix, 2003). Such skills, even if they
are not directly comparable to skills acquired in political careers, may still make leaders
with military backgrounds relatively experienced. It ends up being a modelling choice how
to treat experience in the military. One possibility is to count the number of years in service
as commissioned military officers, in the same manner as we count the number of years in
various political posts, but because we are interested in making our measurement as com-
parable across regimes as possible, we decided not to count years in the military as years in
politics. Besides, military experience does not always directly translate into political skills.
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w/o military w/o coups
1: 2: 3: 4:
Democracy 0.152** 0.113+
(0.057) (0.064)
Democracy, CGV 0.223** 0.192**
(0.074) (0.074)
Constant 0.637** 0.639** 0.676** 0.650**
(0.293) (0.313) (0.297) (0.298)
N 1769 1436 1305 1215
r
2 0.32 0.36 0.35 0.36
Table 9: Robustness Note: Models 1–4 are estimated as fixed-effects regression specifications. Significant
+ p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
From the management literature we know that former military officers who become CEOs
display less risk aversion and more assertive behaviour as business leaders (Malmendier,
Tate and Yan, 2011).
Military experience is generally more akin to what we have labelled domain-experience,
preparing for a narrow domain of national leadership, rather than broader prior-experience
in politics. We only include years of experience if future leaders of military juntas have
a record in formal political posts even if they remained as military officers at the time.
For instance, President Artur da Costa e Silva (1967–69) of Brazil, which had a military
regime at the time, is coded as having close to three years of political experience, because
he had served as war minister from 1964 under another military president, Castelo Branco
(Skidmore, 1988, 19). The alternative would have been to count all 45 years of his military
career as political experience.
To test for the possibility that democracy effects are driven by the fact that non-democracies
include military regimes, where military officers tend to have lower, if any, experience in
formal politics prior to assuming office, in Table 9, Models 1 and 3, we exclude leader-
observations who assume power in military regimes (27 per cent of dictators, or 9 per cent
of all leaders). Because many leaders in dictatorships come to office through a coup, but
subsequently build personalist rather than military regimes, we can also account for this by
excluding leaders who enter office as a result of a coup (Models 2 and 4).
2.7 Leaders in office instead of leaders selected
In Figure 4 in the paper, where we visualise a map of the world coloured by the level of
political experience of leaders in office in 2017, we do not only include leaders who are
selected in 2017, but also those who are still in office but came to office earlier. Our measure
of political experience focuses on the level of political experience at the point of selection,
hence Figure 5 only includes leaders who are selected in that given year. Figure 9 provides
the alternative visualisation, the time trend between democracies and non-democracies in
terms of a “moving average”, where all leaders in office are included. The PolEx is of
course still measured at the point of entry. This figure shows that any reduction in the
difference between democracies and non-democracies will only have a very slow impact on,
















Figure 9: Political Experience over Time: Moving average Note: Replication of Figure 5 in the
paper, including all leaders in office in a given year, with 95% equal tailed credible intervals.
only slowly closing, and democracies still have significantly more experienced leaders.
2.8 Decline in political experience in liberal democracies post-Cold war
What can possibly explain the downward trend in leaders’ political experience among democ-
racies in the 1980s and 1990s, and the positive trend among dictatorships over time? Figure
5 in the paper, as well as additional sub-plots included in Figure 4 in this appendix, all
indicate the increased convergence between democracies and non-democracies over time.
Because our primary goal is to introduce and explain the new measure of political expe-
rience, the substantive question of possible behind the causes of this observed time trend
deserves a more thorough treatment in future research. Still, on the basis of results reported
above as well as few supplementary analyses we can suggest possible reasons.
In brief, we did not find significant differences between PolEx of democratic and non-
democratic leaders of new states (Section 2.3 above). Even if there were more leaders of
newly independent states that are democracies than leaders of equally new states that are
non-democracies—and the numbers are approximately even—their PolEx scores are not that
different. Furthermore, the downward trend among democracies cannot be due to any insti-
tutional changes in leadership selection. Generally speaking, institutions in liberal democra-
cies are very sticky, and by and large there are only insignificant changes in how democracies
select their leaders over time; even fewer changes between presidentialism and parliamen-
tarism and how they select leaders (e.g., Czech Republic transition to a direct presidential
election in 2013 is uncommon).
The relative democratic decline could instead be due to the rise of outsiders, particularly
in Latin America (Carreras, 2014, 2012). For example, the average PolEx of Latin American
leaders in 1985–2005 period is 0.15, in contrast to the average experience of 0.41 for Western
leaders (Western Europe, North America, New Zealand and Australia) that period, or in
contrast to the average experience of 0.27 for the same Latin American region in 2005–17
(0.47 in the West). Given the fact that Latin American democratic leaders are the second
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Pre 1991 After 1991 t-test
Closed autocracy -0.45 (1.07) -0.48 (1.09) -0.1066
Electoral autocracy -0.19 (0.99) -0.14 (1.07) 0.5777
Electoral democracy 0.23 (0.76) 0.12 (0.78) -1.4096
Liberal democracy 0.55 (0.51) 0.33 (0.69) -4.0255
Table 10: Difference in PolEx between Cold War and After
Note: Average PolEx (standard deviation in brackets), based on V-Dem (v2x regime).
largest group of democratic leaders (followed by Western leaders), this factor additionally
explains the pattern.
The steady growth in the average experience of non-democratic leaders is also inter-
esting. Over time, there has been a decline of military regimes, with the less experienced
leaders at their head (see however Table 9, which indicates the exclusion of military regimes
do not affect the overall result), but it is instead the steady growth of PolEx in electoral
autocracies, particularly after the end of the Cold war, that partly explains the positive trend.
We can take a closer look within dictatorships and instead of focusing on categories
based on who governs (military, party, military, monarchy), distinguish between closed and
electoral autocracies. From Coppedge et al. (2019) we know that over time there has been
a growing number of electoral autocracies, and a declining number of closed autocracies.
Earlier, Figure 5 that displayed the average value of PolEx in four regime subtypes, revealed
that the political experience of the leaders of electoral autocracies has increased from around
2005, which additionally explains the closing gap between democracies and autocracies over
all. Still, based on the data from V-Dem that distinguishes between electoral and closed
autocracies, the average value of experience within dictatorships remains relatively stable
over Cold war to post Cold war periods, whether among closed or electoral autocracies, as
we can see from Table 10. What is different, instead, is lower experience among leaders in
electoral democracies, and particularly among leaders of liberal democracies. In fact, the
only category of V-Dem that has statistically significant differences between the Cold war
and post cold war periods is that of liberal democracy: leaders of liberal democracies have
lower PolEx scores after 1991 than their predecessors before 1991 (Student t-test -4.03).
What makes democratic electorates turn to the inexperienced leaders is a question that has
been, and will be, the subject of serious scholarly attention.
3 Robustness Tests
3.1 Evaluating the comparability between regimes
The previous pages have demonstrated how the comparison between democracies and non-
democracies remains relatively robust regardless of the measure of democracy, the exclusion
of new states, the exclusion of military regimes, or the exclusion of coups. Results remain
when relevant control variables are added and in addition to the variation between democ-
racies and non-democracies, interesting variation exists between further subcategories of
political regimes. In this section we return to the PolEx in general, which, regardless of the
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Democracies Non-Democracies
Discrimination (b1) Difficulty (b0) Discrimination (b1) Difficulty (b0)
Nr of years experience 0.877 -3.863 1.247 -2.122
(0.027) (0.125) (0.043) (0.084)
Nr of years formal experience 0.967 -3.090 1.248 -1.640
(0.032) (0.107) (0.044) (0.071)
One prior political post 1.749 -1.640 2.996 -0.430
(0.157) (0.112) (0.300) (0.056)
Prior top post or ministry 0.817 0.694 2.015 0.445
(0.106) (0.110) (0.195) (0.058)
Two prior political posts 1.260 1.317 1.596 1.208
(1.175) (1.143) (0.195) (0.103)
Three prior political posts 2.451 1.664 2.424 1.814
(0.421) (0.161) (0.441) (0.166)
Nr of previous times in office 0.110 -1.569 0.069 -1.400
(0.012) (0.212) (0.011) (0.266)
Table 11: Parameter Estimates of Component Variables by Regime Type
Standard errors for the model parameters in parentheses.
specific question of whether democracies select more experienced leaders or not, is designed
to be comparable across political regimes.
A further validation consists of estimating the latent variable model separately for all
democracies and for all non-democracies (based on the Polity IV measure as in the paper).
Table 11 provides the discrimination and difficulty parameters based on these two separate
estimations. As in the paper, standard errors are based on the standard deviation of the
posterior distribution. While we see some variation in the relevance of different parameters
between the overall results and those separated by the two regimes, overall results are rather
similar. While this is not obvious from the table, Figure 10 shows the predicted PolEx score
for the two models, showing that what changes between the regime types is the intercept
and overall slope, but the versions remain highly correlated.
The different intercepts is primarily an artefact of the fact that the latent variable is con-
straint to be zero on average across all regimes. At higher levels of political experience, that
between democracies and non-democracies is similar, while on average, non-democracies
exhibit lower levels of experience among political leaders. The slope coefficients therefore
“correct” for the divergence in intercepts, such that the average level of experience is zero
and highest level similar across regimes. The correlation between the indicators and PolEx
does not visibly vary between the regime types. The end result is an estimation of PolEx
which is very highly correlated with that of the overall estimation, but since the latent vari-
able is by design zero on average, the intercept is different—especially at lower levels of
PolEx, the PolEx estimated for democracies only is lower than those for the overall dataset,
while those estimated for autocracies only are higher—at high levels of experience, they
converge (roughly, a PolEx of  2 corresponds to a PolEx for democracies of  3 and for
autocracies of  1.5; a PolEx of +1.5 corresponds to a PolEx of +1.5 on the separately
estimated models as well).
Figure 11 underlines this argument, showing how the item response curves—the pre-
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Figure 10: Comparison of PolEx Estimated across Regimes and Separately for Democracies
and Autocracies.
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Figure 11: Item Response Curves
Note: Item response curves for all component variables of the latent variable model, with predicted proba-
bilities for binary component variables (top) and linear predictions for count variables (bottom), with models
estimates for democracies (left) and autocracies (right).
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Democracies
Discrimination (b1) Difficulty (b0)
Nr of years experience 1.095 -2.255
(0.024) (0.059)
Nr of years formal experience 1.349 -1.439
(0.030) (0.045)
One prior political post 1.862 -0.995
(0.099) (0.057)
Prior top post or ministry 0.950 0.609
(0.073) (0.064)
Two prior political posts 0.958 1.585
(0.091) (0.131)
Three prior political posts 1.539 2.140
(0.194) (0.204)
Nr of previous times in office 1.045 2.055
(0.102) (0.158)
Table 12: Parameter Estimates of Component Variables for Alternative Specification
Standard errors for the model parameters in parentheses.
types. The relative roles of all component variables remain the same, but they each impact
stronger in the case of autocracies, where the baseline level of experience is lower and the
impact of any change on any of the component variables correspondingly higher.
3.2 Using an alternative model specification
In the model specification in the paper, we use an inverse hyperbolic sine transformation for
all count variables. This is akin to a logarithmic transformation, but can also be applied to
cases with no experience (zero years), unlike the standard logarithm. This captures the idea
that as the number of years of political experience increase, any additional year will have
a decreasing impact on overall political experience. There is a large difference between
having a few or no years of experience, but not that much difference between having 50 or
40 years of experience. This transformation furthermore leads to a distribution of the count
variables which is more or less normal, allowing for a standard normal linear model for these
component variables, akin to that in standard factor analysis. And factor analysis, in turn, is
closely related to the item response theory model, albeit typically for normally distributed
variables (Takane and De Leeuw, 1987; Glockner-Rist and Hoijtink, 2003; Quinn, 2004).
An obvious alternative to this approach to the count variables in the model would be
to use a poisson instead of a normal distribution for the count variables. This leads to an
otherwise similar model specification. Table 12 provides the discrimination and difficulty
parameters of this alternative model specification. We find that the discrimination param-
eters (or, equivalently, factor loadings) are similar in their distribution across the different
component variables, but different in absolute terms, from those reported in Table 1 in the
paper. That absolute values are different is an obvious effect of changing the link function
between the core IRT specification of b1,EY (gi  b0,EY ) and the component variable EY , but















Figure 12: Political Experience over Time: Alternative Model Specification Note: Replication
of Figure 5 in the paper, using an alternative model specification.
the paper.
Furthermore, Figure 12 shows that our finding in relation to the trend between democra-
cies and non-democracies is virtually identical under this alternative model specification to
that explored in the paper.
4 Descriptive statistics
Finally, an appendix is not complete without a table providing all descriptive statistics on
the variables used in the analysis. Table 13 provides these details for all variables used in
both the paper and this supplementary appendix.
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
PolEx 0.001 0.942 -2.166 1.668 1935
Democracy 0.543 0.498 0 1 1949
Polity2 3.584 6.643 -10 10 1865
Democracy, CGV 0.591 0.492 0 1 1606
Democracy, BMR 0.570 0.495 0 1 1695
Democracy, V-Dem 0.477 0.5 0 1 1949
v2x polyarchy 0.491 0.289 0.01 0.934 1931
GDP pc, (log) 3.84 0.506 2.208 5.271 1556
Economic growth 1.56 5.754 -37.285 50.117 1522
Age at entry 53.988 10.875 16 88 1948
Statehood, years (log) 3.985 1.066 0 5.303 1828
Population, mln 34.157 110.919 0.083 1355.387 1620
Regime durability, log 2.771 1.258 0 5.298 1298
Personalist regime 0.072 0.259 0 1 1949
Military regime 0.087 0.281 0 1 1949
Monarchy 0.036 0.186 0 1 1949
Single party 0.133 0.34 0 1 1949
Formal experience, years 12.115 10.713 0 52 1938
polTopPost 0.236 0.425 0 1 1949
polTopMinistry 0.174 0.38 0 1 1949
Experience, years 17.520 12.859 0 58 1936
Previous times in office 0.170 0.470 0 5 1949
Any previous top post 0.236 0.425 0 1 1949
Any previous top ministry 0.174 0.380 0 1 1949
Any previous top post or ministry 0.388 0.488 0 1 1949
At least one prior political post 0.782 0.413 0 1 1949
At least two prior political posts 0.215 0.411 0 1 1949
At least three prior political posts 0.067 0.250 0 1 1949
Table 13: Descriptive Statistics
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